Five years since its launch, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which envisages funding and building infrastructure in about 78 countries, is riding both high and low. No other developmental initiative has stirred such international debate among academics, policymakers and entrepreneurs.

But while analysts focus on the impact — positive or negative — of this ambitious undertaking, they often remain vague on what counts as “Belt” and “Road” initiatives and what China wants from the scheme. Few understand who in Beijing decides on BRI projects and how the overall budget is distributed through Zhongnanhai, the seat of China’s central government.

The BRI faces three distinctive ironies. The first is that it seeks to address industrial overcapacity but could end up increasing it. The second is that it is seen as centrally run, but is actually quite uncoordinated. The third is that it aims to strengthen state-owned enterprises but in some cases exposes their limitations.