In theory, investors could demand changes - they could insist that banks stop setting aside half their net revenue for compensation, a far higher share than in most industries. But there has been little pressure from that direction. UK institutional investors, who have traditionally exerted more influence on executive pay than their American counterparts, have also shied away from the issue. "We'd be interfering in a very prescriptive way in the management and calling on expertise that we don't really have," says Peter Montagnon, director of investment affairs at the Association of British Insurers.

As more than one top UK banker points out, an inherent conflict also exists: most institutional investors hire professional managers, whose own pay and bonuses are affected by the broader market for financial skills.

Even if the public wants curbs on banker pay, writing effective rules could be tricky. Both the FSA and US Treasury have stuck to uncontroversial broad principles, such as tying pay to risk and forcing executives to return bonuses if revenues are overstated. The difficulty will be in the details. Each bank may have as many as 30 or 40 different pay programmes - all tied to revenue but in different ways. There are also differing time horizons for deferred pay. A three-year plan that motivates a mergers and acquisitions banker may be counterproductive for a trader or a derivatives expert. "This is where regulation goes bad," says Simon Garrett, a UK director in Hay Group's executive compensation practice. "Suppose you look at 19 pay structures and they are OK, and it's the 20th that causes all the trouble. Banks have been brought low by the activity of small parts of their business."