The murky resignation of Brian Dunn, chief executive of Best Buy, is unlikely to solve the company’s problems. But it is a giddy bonanza for the armchair pundits who know what the world’s largest electronics retailer should have done to protect itself from the growth of internet retail. They would have cut more costs (or maybe fewer), provided better customer service, built a proper online portal, and avoided costly international forays.

But it is too late now, apparently. Best Buy is dead! Long live Amazon! Some of the criticisms ring true, but they seem a bit shrill when you look at the numbers. For a company on its death bed, $51bn in annual sales, up a bit from the year before and a few billion more than Amazon, is pretty good. So is $2.5bn in free cash flow, a fifth more than Amazon. Margins have been under pressure: backing out goodwill impairments (but not restructuring costs), operating margins last year were 4.5 per cent, down 30 basis points from the year before and a full percentage point from five years ago.

But on margins, the comparison is particularly instructive: Amazon’s was less than 2 per cent last year and has been tightening. Not only is Best Buy competing against a company that does not have to pay for physical stores; it is competing against a company that does not care about making money. Perhaps Best Buy can stay on its feet until Amazon starts charging prices at which it can make a profit? Amazon’s customers also avoid sales tax and this probably isn’t permanent either.