The love affair between Russia and the west in the era of perestroika was always likely to turn sour. The loss of empire is usually bitter. To imagine a British equivalent to the collapse of the Soviet Union you would have to think of the British Empire's disintegration in the 1930s, when for most English people it was still regarded both as fundamentally benevolent and as part of the natural order. Empire's fall would have had to coincide with the secession of Scotland (Ukraine) and Wales (Belarus), with a devastating economic depression, and with the overthrow of the constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system (the Soviet party-state).

In this context, Russian efforts to reassert international status and preserve a post-imperial sphere of interest are unsurprising. Inevitably, these efforts have increased as Russia has recovered from the low point of the 1990s. Not just the “near abroad” but much of central and western Europe now fears overdependence on Russian oil and gas. When Georgia teased the bear incautiously it discovered that Moscow was once again willing and able to mount effective military operations beyond its borders.

But the biggest risk to international stability has always been Russo-Ukrainian relations, given Ukraine's scale and instability, the size of its Russian minority, and the hold that Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet has over the Russian imagination. Last month's deal to extend the Russian navy's lease at the Sevastopol port in return for lower energy prices is therefore the most welcome news to have come out of the former Soviet region for some time.