No wonder Tim Geithner is getting antsy. Almost two months after its unveiling, the US administration's proposals for reforming bank regulation seem stuck in the Washington mud. The regulatory top dogs who appeared in Congress on Tuesday underlined the inertia. Those same people who have drawn the Treasury Secretary's ire took issue with parts of the package. An empty debate continues to revolve around the benefits or otherwise of a banking “super-regulator”.

It is astonishing that, several months into this process, the authorities remain so firmly focused on form over function. Determining who does what is important – though not as much as regulators believe. Given that the administration's plan opted largely to keep the existing patchwork of agencies, more fundamental is what regulators do collectively, and how well they do it. Repeated mention is made of the need to prevent institutions switching charter, and therefore regulator, to avoid enforcement actions. But that misses the point. Charter flips to avoid sanctions have always been forbidden. Why the rules were not enforced in the first place is the better question to ask.

The need for regulatory checks and balances is real – as are concerns that the Federal Reserve could become an over-burdened political punch-bag. Theorising, however, can only go so far. Investment banks are resurgent. Banks are queuing up to leave the confines of government support. Nor is it clear that any regulator has the resources and ability to analyse the information necessary to prevent past crises repeating themselves – much less to spot new ones waiting to happen. The old supervisory framework failed to keep pace with changes in the structure and activities of the financial sector. This reform effort is failing to keep up with its recovery.