Talk of a “G2” is fashionable, and with good reason. The trip by Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, to Beijing last month underscored the substantial economic and financial interests at stake in the US-China relationship. His trip also signalled growing co- ordination between the two sides. The US avoided criticising an undervalued renminbi, while China committed itself to the dollar and its massive holdings of US government debt.

This change in focus is reflected at an institutional level in China. There is a growing body of research, for example, published by academic and official institutions, looking at China's purchases of US government debt and the implications of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing. There is also anecdotal evidence that the same institutions are focusing more attention on G2-related issues at the expense of other countries.

The change makes sense, as the economic crisis has provided China with an opportunity to assert its economic influence. The push to test renminbi trade settlement, for example, is partly driven by pragmatic interests in reducing exporters' currency exposure and transaction costs. But it also resonates with an official desire that the currency's importance to the global economy will grow in line with China's own economic power.