Bankers and lawyers have revived criticisms that the SFC is malleable, underskilled and out of touch. There is truth in all three charges. But, at bottom, the SFC is hamstrung by the legislative framework in which it operates. Under stock exchange rules, for example, listed companies must disclose price-sensitive information promptly. But, if a company fails to do so – as happened at Citic Pacific, which took several weeks to own up to ruinous currency bets – the SFC cannot impose penalties as there is no law underpinning that rule.

The minibonds affair also exposed fault lines. While the SFC authorises investment products and supervises their sale through brokers, it has no oversight when they are sold through banks. Almost every bank in town got involved in minibonds, watched by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the city state's quasi-central bank.

Uniting Hong Kong's four main regulators and four sub-regulators into an über-regulator with statutory backing, as some desire, would not guarantee improved oversight and enforcement: witness the FSA's failings over Northern Rock in the UK. A “twin peaks” system might be better. One body – a beefed-up SFC – to worry about markets and the products sold into them, while another monitors the solvency of critical institutions. Such a model suits Australia and the US (and would sit well with Hong Kong's skyline.)