In late 2022, Germany’s domestic intelligence chief, Thomas Haldenwang, put it well: “Russia is the storm,” he told German parliamentarians. “China is climate change.”Last year was also the first time the US administration acted as if it truly believed that distinction. Though most of president Joe Biden’s attention was directed at Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in February, his most consequential steps in 2022 targeted China. The uncertainty is no longer about whether US-China decoupling will happen but how far it will go. Much of the answer will become clear in 2023.

Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” offered Biden a perfect case study in the dangers of weaponised interdependence. Having shuttered almost all of its nuclear power sector, Germany’s reliance on Russian gas and oil meant there was no constraint on Putin’s war aims. Germany’s so-called Zeitenwende shortly after Russia’s invasion brought to an end its decades-long bet that deep commercial ties would moderate Russia’s hostilities towards its neighbours. Biden is trying to apply that lesson to the west’s far greater supply chain dependence on China.

This raises two pressing questions. What does Biden mean by decoupling? And will the US be able to bring its allies and partners along?