Whether to allow China’s Huawei to participate in Britain’s 5G networks is one of the most important decisions Boris Johnson’s government will take. Superfast next-generation communications will underpin the “internet of things”, smart cities, self-driving cars, even telemedicine. That, in turn, will create entirely new vulnerabilities to spying and sabotage. In striving to fulfil its aim to be a global 5G leader, the government must weigh the costs of delay against vital security considerations.

There are geostrategic implications, too. The US is threatening to limit intelligence-sharing with Britain in the Five Eyes alliance, which also includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, if it allows Huawei a 5G role. Washington’s concerns that Chinese companies could be used for spying predate Donald Trump’s presidency. The UK, however, must take decisions based on its overall national interest. It should stick to last year’s provisional decision to allow Huawei a role in the radio “periphery” of networks — antennas and masts in which it claims a technological lead — but bar it from the “core” which manages the network.

Britain’s telecoms operators have worked on that basis since the Chinese group started supplying equipment in the UK more than 15 years ago. While Huawei strenuously denies it would ever allow itself to be used by Beijing, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has long assumed the Chinese state “could compel anyone in China to do anything”. Its focus has been on mitigating the risk.