In a belated, correct recognition, the European Commission in March called China an economic competitor and “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. One of the most vivid illustrations of this phenomenon is the interest that a string of countries along Europe’s eastern and south-eastern flank, both EU members and not, have shown in Beijing’s invitation to join its Belt and Road Initiative.

The “17+1” is the informal name for China’s platform to discuss the BRI with the European end of its vast project to tie the Eurasian continent closer together. It captures the balance of influence well: 17 small European countries gathered around one giant. Brussels is right to worry that China is seeking to divide and rule, undermining a collective European policy.

Surprisingly, perhaps, China is not paying heavily for such influence by sending a lot of foreign direct investment to Europe. In fact European FDI in China is much bigger than the other way round, at least when it comes to greenfield investment rather than mere acquisitions of existing assets. Financially, China should be no match for the EU in its own backyard.