Just a few months ago a select committee of the House of Commons chastised the last government for letting a Chinese company supply some of the UK’s critical national infrastructure. The report deemed it remiss of ministers not to have scrutinised more closely the terms by which Huawei supplied components to Britain’s main broadband network. While producing no evidence of abuse, it warned that the “commercial imperative” of cutting costs should not trump national security. The relationship between Chinese companies and Beijing is, after all, often blurred – whether by ownership or corporate dependence on cheap state-sanctioned credit. And China – while a key trading partner – is not a British ally.
就在幾個月前，英國下議院一個特別委員會指責(zé)上一屆英國政府允許中國企業(yè)向英國供應(yīng)一些關(guān)鍵的國家基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。該委員會的報告認(rèn)為部長們失職，沒有更仔細(xì)審查華為(Huawei)向英國主要寬帶網(wǎng)絡(luò)供應(yīng)部件的協(xié)議條款。盡管沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何瀆職證據(jù)，但它警告稱，削減成本的“商業(yè)必要”不應(yīng)凌駕于國家安全之上。畢竟，中國企業(yè)與中國政府之間都有著說不清道不明的關(guān)系——無論從所有權(quán)還是從企業(yè)對政府批準(zhǔn)的廉價信貸的依賴來看。而且，中國盡管是英國的重要貿(mào)易伙伴，但不是英國的盟友。