Investors have given Bob Dudley’s Russia strategy at BP a decidedly Arctic welcome. That is understandable. The BP chief executive’s handling of the shift towards Rosneftfrom BP’s old partners at TNK-BP has been clumsy. BP shareholders resist being diluted by a proposed $16bn share swap with Rosneft now that the Arctic exploration agreement on which it was predicated has been frozen by a court. Mr Dudley’s new strategy has also started a fight with the formidable oligarchs in the AAR consortium, which owns 50 per cent of TNK-BP.

The Rosneft alliance was part of Mr Dudley’s plan to reposition BP after the accident in the Gulf of Mexico and to provide a future source of growth. But BP could still face a gross negligence charge relating to Macondo, which Barclays Capital reckons could cost $60bn. Its share price, meanwhile, is 6 per cent below its pre-Rosneft announcement, and has underperformed the sector by 10 per cent this year. The resignation on Monday of Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s chairman, is unhelpful, though hardly fatal. He remains Russian deputy prime minister in charge of energy policy.

The question BP investors want answered is: what do its AAR partners want as compensation for their exclusion from the Rosneft alliance? AAR’s ferocious pursuit of its interests suggests the price will be high: Mikhail Fridman and his fellow oligarchs who run TNK-BP are considering legal action claiming up to $10bn in damages. Buying AAR’s stake in TNK-BP could cost BP (and Rosneft) $30bn: a stretch, given BP’s financial commitments in the US. But a buy-out, or a timetable for a stock market listing of TNK-BP, would create real value for BP’s long-suffering investors and should put Mr Dudley’s Russia strategy back on track.