Ten years ago this month an obscure former KGB man became Russia's prime minister. Vladimir Putin, now premier again after eight years as president, has many positives in his economic record. Nominal gross domestic product has leapt from $200bn to well above $1,000bn, and average wages from $100 a month to $600. But the past year has also cruelly exposed the weaknesses of Putinomics, showing how it relied on rising commodity prices and cheap foreign credit. Output may shrink 10 per cent this year, making Russia one of the former Soviet bloc's laggards.

Phase one of the original Putin Plan was implemented with some success. The post-Soviet decline in oil production was reversed – in time for the fortuitous upward spiral in world prices. Energy tax rates and collection were increased, helped by the clampdown on oligarch power that culminated in the Yukos case. The problem is phase two – using energy revenues to develop small businesses, manufacturing and technology, and to rebuild infrastructure. Post-Yukos, “statist” hardliners around Mr Putin instead channelled most efforts into creating “national champions” in resources and heavy industry. Moscow now faces a choice of business as usual, or pushing ahead with reforms to reverse the country out of what president Dmitry Medvedev has called the “dead end” of dependence on energy exports. This, however, will be resisted by vested interests heading national champions. And legal reform and curtailing corruption have been made harder as minor officials have aped the asset grabs of superiors.

The outcome of this economic turf war, notes Uralsib, a Moscow brokerage, could set Russia's course for years. Rather than a full-blooded embrace of the bold reform agenda championed by Mr Medvedev, the best to be expected is probably a kind of Putinomics-plus, involving limited efforts to move the economy up the commodity value chain by building more refineries, smelters and timber processors. Not the best start for Medvedomics.