“I am feared; therefore I am.” This is more than a restatement of Machiavelli's celebrated advice that, for a ruler, it “is much safer to be feared than loved”. Vladimir Putin, the latest in the long line of autocratic Russian rulers, would agree with the Italian on that. But the war in Georgia is not just a re-assertion of Machiavelli's principles of statecraft; it is a renewal of Russian national identity. It is yet again feared. In the eyes of its rulers, therefore, it exists.

What is most striking about Russia's justifications is that they are demonstrably inconsistent with its own beliefs, except for the one that matters – the need to be feared. Nothing in the histories of the Russian or Soviet empires suggests that the principle of self-determination matters a jot. Nor has the Russian state ever cared much about the lives of its citizens. Post-Soviet Russia is no different, as the two Chechen wars, with their tens of thousands of dead, have demonstrated. Those, too, were Russian citizens. We can safely discount such hypocritical justifications for its actions. Indeed, I wonder how Russia sells its new-found attachment to the principle of self-determination to its Chinese ally.

No, Russia created a trap for the Georgians and their western backers into which both duly fell. So what were its true motives? Securing control over the pipelines bringing oil and gas westwards is one. Re-establishing its sphere of influence is another. But avenging heaped-up humiliations is surely paramount.