如果石油價格長期停留在每桶70美元，它會讓亞洲高速增長的經(jīng)濟一頭栽倒在地，并結(jié)束很多亞洲國家過去5年高增長低通脹的好時光嗎？要回答這個問題，有必要先提出另一個問題：2002年初以來的油價急劇上漲，迄今為何對該地區(qū)影響如此之??？

Will a prolonged spell of $70-a-barrel oil bring Asia’s high-flying economies crashing to earth and end the heady growth and low inflation in which many have basked for the past five years? To answer that question it is necessary first to pose another: why has the steep rise in oil prices since early 2002 had so little impact on the region so far?

乍一看，亞洲的適應(yīng)能力令人困惑。頭兩次石油危機帶來的效率和節(jié)能措施，幫助西方經(jīng)濟體經(jīng)受這一次油價高漲的沖擊，但日本、香港和新加坡以外的亞洲大部分地區(qū)，仍在大量消耗石油。印度尼西亞每單位經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)出的石油消耗，幾乎5倍于工業(yè)國家的平均水平，即使是發(fā)達(dá)得多的韓國，其消耗的石油也是工業(yè)國家平均水平的2倍。

At first glance, Asia’s resilience is puzzling. Efficiency and conservation measures prompted by the first two oil shocks have helped western economies weather this one. But most of Asia – apart from Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore – still guzzles oil. Indonesia consumes almost four times more per unit of economic output than the average industrialised country. Even much more advanced South Korea requires twice as much.

直到現(xiàn)在，很多亞洲經(jīng)濟體一直受到人為保護(hù)，未承受高油價的全面沖擊。補貼、價格控制和低燃油稅，阻止了高油價轉(zhuǎn)嫁到消費者身上。在沒有采取此類措施的國家，高油價的通脹影響被中國主導(dǎo)的制成品競爭抵消，使各國央行得以保持低利率和寬松的貨幣政策。

Until now, many Asian economies have been shielded from the full impact of high oil prices. Subsidies, price controls and low fuel taxes have kept them from feeding through to consumers. In countries that have not resorted to such measures, the inflationary effects of dearer oil have been offset by Chinese-led competition in manufactured goods, allowing central banks to keep interest rates low and monetary policies loose.

與此同時，充裕的全球流動資金，以及投資者對回報的狂熱追求，使得有經(jīng)常賬戶赤字的國家能夠通過投資組合資本的流入，為更昂貴的石油進(jìn)口融資。而在經(jīng)常賬戶有盈余的國家，高儲蓄率減輕了能源和大宗商品價格上升造成的貿(mào)易條件惡化帶來的沖擊。

Meanwhile, abundant global liquidity and investors’ frenzied quest for returns have enabled countries with current account deficits to finance dearer oil imports through inflows of portfolio capital. In surplus countries, high savings ratios have softened the impact of the deterioration in the terms of trade caused by higher energy and commodities prices.

薄弱的市場紀(jì)律和價格信號抬高了石油消費，讓人沒有動力提高使用效率。這種螺旋上升是無法持續(xù)的，在某個時候，盛宴必將結(jié)束。不清楚的是，結(jié)束的時間是在油價達(dá)到每桶70美元，80美元，還是100美元時，但在亞洲較為脆弱的經(jīng)濟體中，裂縫正開始出現(xiàn)。

Weak market disciplines and price signals have driven up oil consumption and stunted incentives to increase efficiency. The upward spiral is unsustainable. At some point, the party has to end. Whether that point is reached at $70, $80 or $100 per barrel is unclear. But cracks are starting to appear in Asia’s more vulnerable economies.

極度依賴石油進(jìn)口的泰國已付出代價。由于財政負(fù)擔(dān)日益加大，貿(mào)易赤字不斷攀升，泰國被迫取消了去年出臺的不明智的燃油補貼，這進(jìn)一步抑制了需求，而泰國經(jīng)濟本已受到干旱、海嘯和旅游業(yè)收入降低的沉重打擊。

Thailand, which depends exceptionally heavily on oil imports, has already paid the price. A growing fiscal burden and mounting trade deficit have forced it to scrap the fuel subsidies it unwisely introduced last year, further depressing demand in an economy battered by drought, tsunamis and lower tourism revenue.

在印尼，補貼吞噬了高達(dá)三分之一的預(yù)算，政府在取消補貼的問題上猶豫不決，使得印尼喪失了急需的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資的資源。在印度，油價控制正使本已龐大的預(yù)算和經(jīng)常賬戶赤字進(jìn)一步膨脹。補貼大戶中國已被迫限制成品油出口，以應(yīng)對突然爆發(fā)的汽油短缺。

In Indonesia, where subsidies devour as much as a third of the budget, government dithering over scrapping them is depriving the country of resources for desperately needed infrastructure investment. In India, oil price controls are bloating already large budget and current account deficits. And China, also a heavy subsidiser, has been forced to limit exports of refined oil in an effort to combat sudden petrol shortages.

簡而言之，高油價正在暴露曾被繁榮所掩蓋的糟糕的政策和結(jié)構(gòu)性缺陷，正如該地區(qū)1997年經(jīng)濟危機所暴露的那些缺陷。各國的經(jīng)濟增長率幾乎都將受到影響(石油出口國馬來西亞可能例外)，但那些經(jīng)濟管理糟糕的國家將面臨最艱難的調(diào)整。

In short, high oil prices are exposing bad policies and structural weaknesses that were masked during the boom years – just as the region’s economic crisis did in 1997. Although growth rates almost everywhere will be dented – except possibly in oil-exporting Malaysia – countries with poor economic management face the toughest adjustment.

后果可能不會像1997年的危機那么嚴(yán)重，即使每桶70美元的石油，預(yù)計也不會讓亞洲經(jīng)濟陷入衰退。多數(shù)亞洲國家的財務(wù)狀況都比8年前健康得多，高估的固定匯率已被拋棄，銀行系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行了改革，短期外債大幅減少，而且多數(shù)國家都實行了更嚴(yán)格的預(yù)算紀(jì)律。

The consequences are unlikely to be as severe as those of the 1997 crisis. Even $70 oil is not expected to plunge Asian economies into recession. Most are in much sounder financial shape than eight years ago. Overvalued fixed exchange rates have been abandoned, banking systems overhauled, short-term foreign debt cut drastically and, in most cases, tighter budget disciplines imposed.

但隨著危機后的復(fù)蘇步伐加快，自滿現(xiàn)象出現(xiàn)了。該地區(qū)不但浪費了能源，還停止了提高經(jīng)濟效率、減少過度依賴出口導(dǎo)向型增長的努力。雖然部分國家政府試圖刺激國內(nèi)需求，但大部分國家都在深層次結(jié)構(gòu)改革面前停滯不前，而它們需要這些改革來清除市場扭曲，讓市場更具活力和彈性。

However, as the post-crisis recovery gathered pace, it induced complacency. Not only has the region squandered energy, efforts to increase economic efficiency and reduce heavy dependence on export-led growth have stalled. Although some governments have sought to stimulate domestic demand, most have balked at the deep structural reforms needed to remove distortions and make markets more dynamic and flexible.

或許高油價的沖擊將激發(fā)改革。但亞洲各國政府的回旋余地，將由兩個它們無法控制的因素決定：一是美國的貨幣政策走向，卡特里娜(Katrina)颶風(fēng)造成的破壞和油價飆升，使得美國貨幣政策的前景很不明朗。

Perhaps the jolt of high oil prices will kick-start reforms. However, governments’ room for manoeuvre will be determined by two factors beyond their control. One is the future course of US monetary policy, which has been made much less clear by the devastation and spike in oil prices created by Hurricane Katrina.

二是美國的經(jīng)濟狀況?？ㄌ乩锬蕊Z風(fēng)導(dǎo)致很多經(jīng)濟學(xué)家調(diào)低了對近期經(jīng)濟增長的預(yù)測。還有一個更大的擔(dān)憂是，美國的房產(chǎn)泡沫會破滅，引起美國消費者大幅削減支出。鑒于亞洲其它國家嚴(yán)重依賴對中國的出口，而中國的大部分增長依賴對美出口，因此沖擊波將傳遍整個地區(qū)。正如摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)首席經(jīng)濟學(xué)家史蒂芬?羅奇(Stephen Roach)近期所指出的，全球化是把雙刃劍：它在經(jīng)濟景氣時廣泛傳播好處，但也會把沖擊迅速傳遍全球。

The second is the state of the US economy. Katrina has caused many economists to trim their near-term growth forecasts. A still bigger concern is that the US housing bubble will burst, causing American consumers to cut spending sharply. Given the rest of Asia’s heavy dependence on exports to China, which in turn relies for much of its growth on exports to the US, the shockwaves would spread throughout the region. As Stephen Roach, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist, recalled recently, globalisation works both ways: it spreads benefits widely in good times but it also transmits shocks rapidly around the world.

我們只能猜測這樣一個惡性循環(huán)的發(fā)生概率。但目前亞洲經(jīng)濟前景的不確定性，比1997年危機以來的任何時候都更多、更大。就在各國政府和市場5年來似乎逐漸遺忘風(fēng)險之際，風(fēng)險卻在悄悄逼近。

The probability of such a vicious circle developing can only be guessed at. But Asia’s economic prospects are today clouded by more and greater uncertainties than at any time since its 1997 crisis. After five years in which governments and markets seemed increasingly oblivious to risk, it is stalking the region again.

譯者/李功文