The long-predicted weaponisation of trade has, it seems, finally arrived. The US-China rivalry and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have politicised commerce to an extent not seen since the cold war. It’s not just that governments are increasingly blocking geopolitical rivals’ access to militarily sensitive technology. The big trading powers have also restricted exports of vital materials and tried to prevent adversaries selling their own commodities abroad. But just because governments are keen on export curbs and trade sanctions doesn’t mean they work. Beijing’s imposition of controls on critical minerals, the US-led G7 club of rich countries’ sanctions on Russian oil, Russia’s own attempted coercion of western Europe by cutting off gas supply: all have caused alarm, but none has yet succeeded in crippling its target. Governments cannot muster enough control over global demand to choke off trade, supply chains are agile, sometimes illicitly so, and end users have found alternatives.
早在意料之中的“貿(mào)易武器化”似乎終于到來了。美中對(duì)抗和俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，使商業(yè)的政治化達(dá)到了冷戰(zhàn)以來從未見過的程度。不僅各國(guó)政府越來越多地阻止地緣政治對(duì)手獲得軍事敏感技術(shù)，貿(mào)易大國(guó)還限制關(guān)鍵材料的出口，并試圖阻止對(duì)手出口他們自己的大宗商品。