Yet, investors may have a point. Short-term external debts on a remaining maturity basis, which includes the current portion of long-term debt, stood at $194bn at the end of 2008. That compares with $200bn of foreign exchange reserves, giving Korea one of Asia's skimpiest coverage ratios. Arguably the ratio is lower still if less liquid instruments are taken out of the equation. Leaving in asset-backed securities – supposedly mainly mortgage-backed securities issued by government-sponsored agencies – but excluding corporate bonds gives liquid reserves of about $170bn. On top of that, Korea can call on $13bn remaining from a $30bn US swap line and a further $20bn agreed with the Bank of Japan. (Another swap line, worth about $26bn and agreed with China, is essentially in local currency; the two sides are still discussing how this will be used and there are no guarantees on conversion into US dollars). The swap lines, in effect, bring coverage back up to just over one times.
不過，投資者或許是有理由的。2008年底，韓國按剩余期限計算的短期外債（包括長期債務的當期部分）總額為1940億美元，而外匯儲備為2000億美元，使其成為亞洲經濟體中償債能力比最差的一個。如果不計入流動性較差的工具，這個比率可能還會更低。如果計入資產支持證券——估計主要是政府支持的機構發行的抵押貸款支持證券——但不包括公司債券，那么韓國的流動性儲備約為1700億美元。此外，韓國還可以動用與美國達成的300億美元外匯掉期協議中剩余的130億美元額度，以及與日本央行達成的200億美元外匯掉期額度。（另一項與中國簽署的互換協議額度約為260億美元，但其幣種以本幣為主；而且雙方仍在討論如何使用這一額度，而且不保證會轉換成美元。）實際上，外匯掉期協議只是將韓國的外債償付能力提高至略多于1倍而已。